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**The Director of Central Intelligence**

Washington, D.C. 20505

**National Intelligence Council**

**SC#632365/88  
22 September 1988**

**Memorandum For: Director of Central Intelligence**

**From:**

**Assistant National Intelligence Officer for  
Near East and South Asia**

**Subject:**

**Near East and South Asia  
Warning and Forecast Meeting: 15 September  
1988**

1. The Warning and Forecast meeting was held on 15 September 1988 from 14:00 to 16:30 at CIA Headquarters in room 7E32.

**Highlights**

**West Bank Uprising.** *Unrest likely to continue at current levels indefinitely. Israeli elections likely to yield Likud-led government that will take increasingly harsh measures against Palestinians. Many Israeli officers say a political solution is needed and are unhappy serving in the West Bank. Only extreme, long-term US pressure would influence Likud. King Hussein might eventually resume a role on a settlement for the West Bank.*

**Crushing the Kurds.** *Unprecedented Iraqi attacks will weaken the rebels near Turkish border, although the insurgency may resume later. New attacks on Kurds near Iran are likely soon. Iraq used lethal chemicals but the scope and results of such attacks are not clear. Baghdad is not waging genocide against the Kurds. US economic sanctions would not influence Iraqi policy on the Kurds or chemical weapons.*

**Post-Zia Pakistan.** *No new information on cause or suspects in Zia's death. Generals are wary of*

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*Bhutto despite her efforts to mollify the military. Elections still likely in November, but Pakistan faces political turmoil in post-election maneuvering. No changes in Pakistani policy toward Afghan insurgents, the US, or in response to recent Soviet/Afghan airstrikes on Pakistan.*

2. West Bank Uprising and the Implications of Jordan's Renunciation of Sovereignty. (Summary of presentation by CIA). The Arab uprising, "intifadah," in the occupied territories is likely to continue indefinitely. It has evolved from widespread, large demonstrations in the early months to smaller clashes with rock throwing and firebombs in scattered parts of the territories. Changing tactics has allowed the Arabs to continue the struggle, at a lower level, despite Israeli countermeasures. No major change in Israeli policies can be expected until after the Israeli and US elections.

-- The uprising has improved the Likud Party's election prospects because of the Israeli population's turn--in time of Arab threats--to parties advocating strong measures. Likud and the small rightwing or religious parties probably will gain a majority of Knesset seats and form a government. Only extreme US pressure over a long term would influence Likud to adopt more moderate policies on the territories.

-- King Hussein renounced sovereignty over the West Bank because of a lack of support and the high political and economic costs for Jordan of continuing activities there. Amman hoped this move would cause enough of a shock to the US, PLO, and Israel to break the peace process stalemate. Hussein expects the PLO to suffer reverses on the West Bank and to turn eventually to Jordan for help. CIA analysts believe the King has not removed himself totally from the West Bank peace process. Under the right circumstances, he might be willing to resume an active role.

-- Israel will prevent the PLO from setting up rival institutions to administer the occupied territories. The PLO, however, will continue to command wide popular support because the uprising has generated a great degree of dedication among the local Palestinians to an independent state.

-- The chances that the PLO will declare a government-in-exile are steadily decreasing and are now probably less than 50 percent. Debate over such a move has increased factional infighting in the PLO. Pro-Syrian extremists are opposed because they believe a government-in-exile would lead to recognition of and

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direct talks with Israel. PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat has adopted a cautious, wait-and-see policy and will not decide the issue in the near term.

3. *Community Discussion.* Community members agreed that Arafat's recent speech in France lacked new policy. CIA stated that such trial balloons were not enough to influence the Israelis. The PLO had to make dramatic policy changes to affect Tel Aviv. Dramatic changes were unlikely in the PLO because any change led to factionalism and infighting among the Palestinian leaders.

4. A Likud led government is likely to increase harsh measures to crush the "intifadah." New tactics might include more deportations, destruction of houses, new settlements in the territories, or even live fire against demonstrators. Some analysts commented on the likely resurgence of underground Israeli vigilante organization in the territories. International media pressure would not cause Likud to ease up on the pressure. The hard-line Likud leaders, including those likely to assume power in the next decade, believe that military pressure can suppress the uprising indefinitely. Although the intifadah would not be stopped completely, the level of unrest would be tolerable.

5. [redacted] reported that high ranking Israeli military officers claimed Israel would eventually crush the uprising. Other analysts noted, in contrast, that some officers and many enlisted men had become disillusioned with service in the territories and preferred to serve in Lebanon. Israeli generals have stated that while they can control the uprising, they could never stop it and that the situation needed a political solution.

6. Although less committed to Gaza than the West Bank, Tel Aviv is unlikely to give up control of Gaza. Such a move would set a precedent that later might be used to force Israel to yield other territory. Moreover, Tel Aviv would not abandon any land as long as the uprising continues, fearing that the Arabs would view this as evidence that the uprising was weakening Israel and its leaders.

7. Crushing the Kurdish Insurgency. (Summary of discussion led by CIA) The recent Iraqi attacks against the Kurds are the largest efforts Baghdad has launched to crush the insurgency. Although the attacks appear to have been successful and will disrupt Kurdish rebel activities in the short term, the insurgency may revive in the longer term.

-- Baghdad's recent efforts have been aimed at Kurdish strongholds near Turkey. Iraq probably will soon launch new attacks against the Kurds in the areas near the border with Iran.

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-- Iraq's strategy has two objectives: destroy or disrupt Kurdish insurgent bases and headquarters and eliminate Kurdish civilian support for the insurgency. Military operations are intended to undermine Kurdish confidence in insurgent military leaders and capabilities. Efforts also have been made to seal the border with Turkey to prevent the return of insurgents back into Iraq.

-- Iraq probably has used lethal and non-lethal chemical weapons against the Kurds. The extent of such attacks and their results are not clear.

-- Operations in Kurdistan have not significantly strained Iraqi relations with Turkey. Both countries have an interest in maintaining good relations and suppressing the Kurds. Any decline in Iraqi/Turkish relations is likely to be minor and temporary.

-- Iran so far has not provided support to the Kurds during the recent Iraqi attacks. Turkey has sent some Kurdish refugees to Iran.

#### 8. *Community discussion.*

9. Iraq probably used chemicals to keep its military casualties low. Baghdad also probably judged that chemicals would weaken Kurdish morale and force civilian supporters of the insurgents to flee the area. [redacted] indicated that some Kurdish groups had warning of the impending Iraqi attacks and abandoned areas before the battle.

10. Community members agreed that Iraq was not waging a war of genocide against the Kurds. Baghdad viewed Kurdish insurgents, especially those who had supported Iran, as traitors. Most of Iraq's three million Kurds, however, were loyal to Baghdad during the war. Baghdad's efforts to relocate Kurds from mountainous areas in the North are intended to break up the Kurdish community and reduce the chances of a renewed insurgency. Some analysts pointed out that historically Iraq had treated its Kurds better than Iraq or Turkey.

11. US economic sanctions against Iraq would have little or no influence on Baghdad's use of chemical weapons or

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attacks on the Kurds. Many countries have already approached Iraq with plans for postwar reconstruction projects. Such countries would supply any goods or services the US was unwilling to provide. Iraq has very large oil reserves and can use oil export revenue to obtain goods without US credits.

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13. Pakistan: Post Zia Stability. (Summary of presentation by CIA) Pakistan remains calm but uneasy a month after President Zia's death. So far the military appears to be relatively satisfied with the interim government of President Ishaq Khan. Nonetheless, military leaders continue to raise the issue of a "foreign threat" which might be used later as an excuse to cancel the elections.

-- No new information is available on the cause or suspects in Zia's plane crash. Pakistan has control of the investigation and may prepare two reports; one classified and the other for public distribution.

-- The election campaign is still relatively calm. Factionalism in the Pakistan Muslim League has further weakened that party.

-- Benazir Bhutto has made notable efforts to try to improve her relations with the Pakistani military. She has kept her election platform vague to try to attract a wide following. The lack of a program, however, will weaken the ability of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) to govern if it were to take power.

-- If a fair election were held today, the PPP probably would win at least a plurality of seats in the assembly.

14. *Community Discussion.* Analysts expressed differing opinions on the chances that elections will be held. Some saw as high as a 70 percent chance that elections would occur as planned. They judged that General Beg and the military had the best chance to take power shortly after Zia died, but they apparently decided against such a course. The military is happy to be out of politics and is comfortable with the idea of exercising power behind a civilian facade. Other analysts see less than a 50 percent chance that elections will occur. They state that the military is afraid of Bhutto and will never let her take power. Bhutto lacks the competence and sensitivity to rule Pakistan and keep the military contented. Pakistan's generals will allow elections to take place only if a Pakistan Muslim League victory is assured. The prospect

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that Bhutto's PPP will be successful--the most likely outcome today--will cause the military to act.

15. The military is not likely to impose martial law immediately in response to election unrest. Instead, the Army probably would delay the elections for an unspecified period. Martial law would only be reimposed as a last resort.

16. Members agreed that Pakistan is likely to face continued political turmoil even after the elections. Conflict may become even more extreme after the elections as various parties and factions begin to maneuver for political power in the new government. Analysts noted that under Pakistan's vague and confusing constitution, the President does not have to name a prime minister and need not name one from the majority party or a party leader.

17. The PPP would likely split apart if the current regime were to offer to form a coalition unity government after the elections. Some of the PPP leaders would be strongly tempted to become part of a new government while others would oppose any deal with the Muslim League. Analysts also noted that Bhutto will become more vulnerable to charges within the PPP of selling-out if she goes too far in trying to accommodate the Pakistani Army.

18. Analysts reported no evidence of a decline in Pakistani support for the Afghan insurgents. Although the insurgents were initially worried after Zia's death, they have regained confidence as Islamabad has continued support for the resistance. Afghan regime morale has declined after initial hopes for a change in post-Zia Pakistani policy have not been fulfilled. Islamabad also has not changed in its relations with the US or the Soviet Union.

19. [redacted] community members agreed there was no evidence that Foreign Minister Yakub Khan had tried to take control of Pakistani policy toward the Afghan resistance from Pakistani Military Intelligence. Analysts judge that Khan would be unsuccessful if he were to try such a move.

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20. CIA analysts stated that the increase in Soviet/Afghan airstrikes in Pakistan in early September probably were an effort to put additional pressure on Islamabad. The attacks had not caused Pakistan to alter its policies however. DIA analysts stated they were not convinced that the evidence showed deliberate or deep strikes into Pakistan. Community members agreed that Pakistan had an interest in portraying the attacks in extreme terms to try to gain support in the US for the sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Pakistan.

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